Chapter 2: Iran’s financial support to paramilitary groups in the Middle East

2. Iran’s financial support to paramilitary groups in the Middle East

Contents of this chapter:
Overview
Hezbollah in Lebanon (since 1983)
Shia militias in Iraq (since 2003)
Hamas in Gaza (since 2007)
The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (since 2007)
Houthi rebels in Yemen (since 2010)
The Al-Assad regime in Syria (since 2011)
Sources of financial support
Notes & References

2.1 Overview

Since 1979, Iran’s foreign policy has not only consisted of traditional diplomacy; it has also relied on the provision of funds, weapons, strategic advice and military training to allied governments and paramilitary groups in the Middle East as an instrument to achieve its objectives.3

In the following sections, an overview of information from a broad range of sources is summarised, with the aim of quantifying suspected Iranian funding to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shia militias in Iraq, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, the Houthis in Yemen and militias fighting on the side of the Assad regime in Syria. The aim of the research at hand is not to provide a historical and political background to these groups and conflicts. It only focusses on their financial and material links to Iran.

2.2 Hezbollah in Lebanon (since 1983)

Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbullah) was founded in 1982 as a Shia Muslim political group with an armed wing in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. From the beginning the party had close ties to Tehran and is seen by many as Iran’s proxy in Lebanon and the Middle East more broadly. This is clear in the ongoing war in Syria, where Hezbollah has provided crucial military support to President Bashar al-Assad (see section 2.7).4 The US, the EU, Israel and various Arab Gulf countries have designated the military wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation.5

In its founding manifesto published in 1985, Hezbollah vowed its loyalty to Iran’s then Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. According to various sources, Iran has provided the group with considerable financial, military and organisational support from the very beginning. Indeed, in its infancy, the group received critical training and funding from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a military and internal security institution (see section 2.8.1 for more details on the IRGC).6 In addition, the IRGC reportedly has an officer appointed to oversee Hezbollah’s operations on behalf of the Islamic Republic.7 Top-ranking military officers are also reported to have provided trainings to the party’s militant arm over the years.8

Historically, Hezbollah has rejected allegations that it was dependent on Iranian support, at least in official statements. Similarly, the Iranian government insisted for a long time that it provided moral but not material support to Hezbollah.9 However, in recent years, material funding has frequently been confirmed by Iranian and Hezbollah spokespeople.10

One of the first public admissions was made in 2009, when Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah thanked Iran for providing “[…] all the moral, political, materialist [sic] and financial support.”11 In February 2012, Nasrallah acknowledged openly his party’s dependence on aid from Iran. Claiming that previously he had not wished “to embarrass our brothers in Iran,” he noted that since Iran had admitted the support, the time had arrived for Hezbollah to do so as well. “Yes, we received moral, and political and material support in all possible forms from the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1982.[…] In the past we used to tell half the story and stay silent on the other half.[…] When they asked us about the material and financial and military support we were silent.”12 In July 2015, Nasrallah was quoted saying: “We say this loud and clear: we receive material and financial support from the Islamic Republic, and we are proud of that fact.” According to Nasrallah, the support provided by Iran was sufficient for Hezbollah, dismissing claims of money-laundering activities by the party.13

Few details are publicly available about Hezbollah’s finances. Iran is believed to provide the group with at least US$ 100 million per year. Yet details about the extent and sources of Iran’s financial support remain hard to come by, as Lebanese political analyst Amal Saad-Ghorayeb explains.14

Estimates often do not include additional Iranian funding for crisis periods, such as the 2006 war with Israel, for which costs covered by Iran have been estimated at as much as US$ 1.2 billion. Nor do they include exceptional circumstances such as the June 2009 parliamentary election, for which Hezbollah reportedly received foreign funding.15

Looking at different sources and estimates, the level of Iranian funding to Hezbollah has considerably fluctuated over the years.

1980s and 1990s

According to one piece of research on the early years of Hezbollah, Iran’s annual subsidy was estimated at US$ 140 million during the 1980s.16 In 1997, the Supreme National Security Council of Iran reportedly decided to increase Iran’s military and financial support to Hezbollah from US$ 80 million in 1996 to US$ 100 million in 1997.17 Matthew Levitt from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy also estimated Iran’s annual contribution to Hezbollah in the 1990s to be at least US$ 100 million per year.18

2000s to 2010

The estimates for the flow of Iranian funds to Hezbollah in the early 2000s vary depending on the source, ranging between US$ 60, US$ 100 and US$ 200 million per year, reportedly peaking in 2008/09 due to rocketing oil prices.19,20

An article from 2004 referred to Western diplomats and analysts in Lebanon suggesting that Hezbollah may have received closer to US$ 200 million a year from Iran at that time.21 This figure has been quoted by various US sources over the years.22 In the wake of the death of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Hezbollah reportedly received an additional US$ 22 million from the Iranian intelligence to support Palestinian armed factions and provoke instability in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.23

The US State Department reported in its 2008 ‘Country Reports on Terrorism’ that Iran provided an estimated US$ 200 million in funding to Hezbollah during that year and trained over 3,000 Hezbollah fighters at camps in Iran. This support helped the group re-arm itself to levels beyond those of the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel.24

Similar figures were given by the US Department of Defense in April 2010: between US$ 100 million and US$ 200 million a year.25 According to Israeli intelligence sources, between 2006 and 2009, Iran provided Hezbollah with more than US$ 1 billion in direct aid, equaling to about US$ 250 million per year.26

During a visit to Lebanon in October 2010, then Iranian president Ahmadinejad reportedly boasted of Iranian money and weaponry spent reconstituting the Hezbollah military arsenal that had been depleted in the 2006 war with Israel. According to Hezbollah officials, the group spent up to US$ 1.1 billion of Iranian money on rebuilding destroyed areas in the aftermath of the 2006 war.27 Another source estimated the Iranian aid provided in connection with the war with Israel at US$ 1.2 billion.28

Israeli army officials also indicated that Iran and Syria not only re-armed Hezbollah, but also helped it considerably improve the accuracy of its large arsenal of missiles.29

Iran has long been a major arms supplier to Hezbollah. Iranian shipments of weapons destined to Hezbollah, with Syria as the main transit country, have repeatedly been intercepted. Iran has also trained Hezbollah fighters at camps in Lebanon and Iran.30 Reported shipments prior to the 2006 conflict with Israel include the ‘Fajr’ and ‘Khaybar’ series of rockets, over 10,000 ‘Katyusha’ rockets, and ‘Mirsad’ unmanned aerial vehicles.31

In 2002, the media reported on Iran financing and establishing military training camps in the Beka’a Valley, then controlled by the Syrian army. Trainings for Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad fighters reportedly included the use of rockets such as the short-range ‘Fajr-5’ missile and the ‘SA-7’ anti-aircraft rocket. According to a report by an unnamed Western intelligence agency, the Iranian training programme cost US$ 50 million.32

In August 2006, Jane’s Defense Weekly reported that Hezbollah asked Iran for “a constant supply of weapons” to support its operations against Israel. According to Western diplomatic sources, the Iranian authorities promised Hezbollah a steady supply of weapons.33

Assistance also came in the form of aid for Hezbollah’s political pursuits. Iranian officials announced in 2008 that Hezbollah, then making headway into Lebanon’s political life, would receive US$ 600 million in ‘election financial aid’ to help the party’s prospects in Lebanon’s parliamentary elections in 2009.34

Despite denials by officials of Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV channel,35 various Middle East analysts and journalists maintain that Iranian funding also includes Al-Manar, be it direct or indirect via Hezbollah.36 Al-Manar reportedly received seed money from Iran and incurred initial operating costs of US$ 1 million in the early 1990s.37 By 2002, the annual budget of the channel had grown to approximately US$ 15 million, with Iran reportedly still directly or indirectly contributing part of the required funds.38

2010 onwards

According to some analysts, financial support by Iran to Hezbollah has been cut twice over time, with no prior notice. In at least one of these instances, the cut affected as much as 30 to 40 percent of the support. According to Matthew Levitt from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, this triggered a diversification of the group’s financial portfolio beyond the estimated US$ 200 million that they received from Iran.39

In 2010, Israeli intelligence assessments came to the conclusion that the annual direct military aid from Iran was cut by as much as 40 percent.40 Others questioned that, however, saying that US$ 100 million to US$ 200 million was not a large sum for Iran and that, if aid to Hezbollah was a high priority, it could easily continue at the same level.41

Observers believe that Iranian support to Hezbollah may have increased again since 2013 in conjunction with Hezbollah’s direct involvement in the war in Syria. However, no new estimates quantifying such an increase have been published.42 Regional security officials told Reuters that between 2,000 and 4,000 Hezbollah fighters, experts and reservists operated in Syria in September 2013.43 According to internal Hezbollah-sources, the militant group had as many as 6,000 combatants paid by Iran fighting alongside al-Assad’s troops.44

In 2014/15, new reports emerged on Hezbollah implementing ‘austerity measures’, largely due to the troubled economic situation in Iran due to declining global oil prices, the impact of international sanctions and the financial support funneled to other trouble zones in the region, namely Syria.45 In March 2014, the US Treasury Department reported the sanctions regime was “[…] squeezing Tehran’s ability to fund terrorist groups such as Hezbollah”.46 The London-based paper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat reported in April 2014 that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei continues to fund Hezbollah through his separate budget; however, the government’s flow of money to the militant group was apparently stopped by the Iranian president Rouhani five months earlier during the reorganisation of Tehran’s Foreign Ministry. In addition, the newspaper reported that the US and Europe are keeping a close watch on Iranian sources funding Hezbollah.47

As a result of its tightening budget, sources close to Hezbollah’s central command reported that the group had to fire many employees working within the party’s social, health, media and service institutions, to impose salary cuts, defer payments to suppliers and reduce monthly stipends to its political allies in Lebanon.48

However, while the budget was apparently cut by as much as 40 percent in 2015, this cut seemingly affected Hezbollah’s social and health services, not its military budget.49 The fighters and their families reportedly still receive an average of US$ 1,000 per month, depending on their rank and responsibilities.50

According to analysts, Tehran is not the only source of funding for Hezbollah. The group has acquired a reasonable degree of financial autonomy over the years through its own investments and charities. Revenue streams also come from import-export activities, the collection of donations, and operating an overseas network of legal and illegal businesses.51

Experts at the ‘Iran Project’ think that, while Hezbollah will be able to find financial sources without its main sponsor, Iran is above all an important supplier of weapons, particularly rockets and missiles. Maintaining this supply line is also seen as one of the key reasons for Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict.52

Overall, Hezbollah continues to rely on significant funding from Iran. The impact of Iranian budget cuts on Hezbollah’s ability to bankroll its social welfare network of schools and hospitals illustrates the level to which Hezbollah is still dependent on Iran.53

2.3 Shia militias in Iraq (since 2003)

Iran’s support to Shia armed groups in Iraq dates back to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, this support continued as Iraq’s exiled Shia parties returned with Iran’s help.54

2003 to 2007

From 2003 onward, the key Iranian-backed militias were the Mahdi Army, the armed wing of the Sadrist movement, and the Badr Corps.55 They reportedly received from Iran training, funding and weapons, including mortars, rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, as well as highly-lethal explosively-formed penetrators (EFPs).56 Mahdi Army fighters also received training in Iranian camps as early as 2004.

In 2005 and 2006, the IRGC Qods Force reportedly expanded this effort with the help of Hezbollah Lebanon. Ali Mussa Daqduq, a senior member of Hezbollah, went to Iran to instruct Iraqi militants alongside the IRGC Qods Force commanders. According to the US-led Multi-National Forces in Iraq, the Qods Force provided Daqduq with a budget as high as US$ 3 million on a monthly basis.57

The supply of explosives and bomb-making material to Shia militants via the Iranian border was already a concern in 2005, as reported in classified US military documents. Nonetheless, figures quantifying the support before 2006 are difficult to find.58

According to a US government intelligence analyst, the support provided by Iran to Iraqi militias increased in the second half of 2006, with the aim of forcing the US military out of Iraq. In 2007, a US military representative quoted information provided by detained members of Shia militias confirming that the IRGC Qods Force backed Iraqi Shia militants by supplying weapons, training and monthly allowances worth between US$ 750,000 and US$ 3 million.59

In 2007, a US government official in Iraq estimated the annual financial support provided by Iran to different actors in Iraq at US$ 150 million to US$ 200 million. In addition, significant support in the form of training, technical support and arms, including rockets and mortars, was provided to various Iraqi Shia militias by the Qods Force.60

2008 to 2010

Iraqi officials and the US military estimate that Iran in 2009 provided weapons and financial backing worth an estimated US$ 36 million to the Mahdi Army and other Shia militias. In addition, the Qods Force, together with Hezbollah Lebanon, was suspected of training Iraqi Shia militants and providing them with armor-penetrating explosives.61 In the period from 2008 to 2010, the small Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq militia grew significantly in influence due to Iranian support.62

Leaked US embassy cables from November 2009 explain that the financial and operational support provided by Iran to competing Shia, Kurdish and some Sunni groups aimed to create a broad range of groups dependent on Iran’s generosity among Iraq’s political players. For lack of exact figures, the US State Department estimated Tehran’s financial backing of Iraqi proxies at the time at US$ 100 million to US$ 200 million annually, with US$ 70 million going to Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and its Badr Corps militia.63

2011 onwards

After the US troops officially left Iraq in 2011, Iran helped reactivate and empower some of the Shia militias to support the Iraq Security Forces against the so-called Islamic State (IS). These included As’aib Ahl Al Haq, Kata’ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades) and the Badr Organization.64

As of 2014, up to 50 Shia militias were recruiting in Iraq, at least 37 of them with ties to Iran.65 The majority of these militias are part of the so-called ‘al-Hashd al-Sha’bi’, or the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), an umbrella organisation of predominantly Shia militias set up in June 2014 and sponsored by both the Iraqi and Iranian governments.66 Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Badr Brigades, and Kataib Hezbollah are seen as key players in the fight against IS. Together they are described as being the most powerful military force in the country.67 Other important members of al-Hashd al-Sha’abi include Kata’ib Imam Ali and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba.68

As’aib Ahl al-Haq has close connections to Lebanon’s Hezbollah and ideological links to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. According to an Iraqi intelligence official quoted in 2014, the group receives US$ 1.5 million to US$ 2 million a month from Iran.69 Another Iraqi source close to the extremist group estimated in 2011 that As’aib Ahl Al-Haq relies on Iran for approximately US$ 5 million in cash and weapons on a monthly basis.70

In addition, Iranian opposition groups estimated in 2014 that approximately 7,000 members of the IRGC Qods Force under the command of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani were on the ground in Iraq, both fighting and training militia forces.71

According to the US State Department, Iran increased training and funding to Iraqi Shia militia groups in 2014 in response to IS’ advance in Iraq.72 Quoting an unnamed senior Iranian cleric with close ties to Tehran’s leadership, the Washington Post reported in December 2014 that Iran had sent elite units and more than 1,000 military “advisers” to Iraq since the capture of much of northern Iraq by IS in June of the same year. In addition, Iran reportedly conducted air strikes and spent more than US$ 1 billion on military aid.73 The source did not specify whether the funds went to the Iraqi government or to Shia militias.74

In March 2015, the secretary-general of Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Sheikh Akram al-Kaabi, stated in an interview that “[w]e do not hide the fact that the technical and logistical support comes from the [Iranian] Islamic Republic at all levels of training, arming and with the provision of advice through the presence of leaders and field advisers from the brothers in the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards.”75

In March 2015, Hezbollah Lebanon decided at a meeting of the Jihad Council headed by Hassan Nasrallah to send 800 elite fighters to Iraq to take part in the battles for Tikrit and Mosul. Equipped by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards already present in the town, the Hezbollah troops also provided training to Iraqi Shia militia fighters.76

According to an internal Iraqi intelligence report leaked to the media, the number of armed militias in Iraq in mid-2015 was 53, up from 43 in December 2014, with a total membership of 120,000 militiamen. The “only common factors” among them, the report adds, are the “extremist religious cover” and the source of their funding: Iran. Each militia is said to receive from Tehran between 100,000 and 500,000 US dollars per month, depending on its size and its achievements, in addition to Russian- and Iranian-made weapons.77

In a series of interviews by Reuters published in February 2015, key figures inside the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces detailed the ways in which these militias cooperate with Baghdad and Tehran, and the role that Iranian ‘advisers’ play, both inside the groups and on the frontlines. The interviewees included two senior figures in the Badr Organisation and the commander of a relatively new militia called Saraya al-Khorasani.78 Saraya al-Khorasani was founded in 2013 and advised by IRGC General Hamid Taghavi, who was killed in northern Iraq in December 2014.79

Iraqi officials told Reuters that former Badr commander Jamal Jaafar Mohammed, better known by his nom de guerre Abu Mahdi al-Mohandis, is General Qassem Soleimani’s right hand in Iraq, and militiamen praised him as “the commander of all troops,” whose word is “like a sword above all groups.”80

Several of the Shia militias receiving Iranian funding in Iraq also sent fighters to Syria in recent years.81 The Guardian reported in March 2014 that the families of ‘martyrs’ receive a one-time compensation of up to US$ 5,000 from Iran.82

2.4 Hamas in Gaza (since 2007)

According to various different sources, the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, receives external support from several states and non-state groups or networks. Historically, however, Hamas fighters were supplied with most of their funding and weapons by Iran.83 While otherwise focusing its support on Shia militias, Iran seems to be willing to put aside its sectarian differences and back this Sunni militant group. This cooperation provides the Iranian Revolutionary Guards with access to the southern border of Israel, a joint enemy of both Hamas and the regime in Tehran.84

2007 to 2010

Quoted in Arabic-language Raya News in early 2014, Ali Nourizadeh, Director of the Center for Iranian Studies, estimated that Hamas has received more than US$ 2 billion from Iran since the group’s inception in 1987. According to Nourizadeh, Hamas received the aid through various channels, either in cash, when Hamas leaders visit Tehran, or through Hezbollah Lebanon.85

Sources inside Gaza as well as international analysts have estimated Iran’s support to Hamas to be somewhere in the range of US$ 250 million annually provided to cover the budget of the Hamas-led government in Gaza.86 At the same time, Iran also reportedly provided the armed wing of Hamas, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, with weapons, technical know-how and military training.87 However, no more than 500 Hamas fighters were apparently trained by Iran.88

Other sources give somewhat lower figures for the financial support. According to a 2009 article quoting Saeb Oraikat, then an official from the Palestinian Authority, Tehran awarded Hamas at the time a monthly budget of US$ 10 million, or an estimated annual budget of US$ 120 million.89 The Washington Institute, quoting Israeli intelligence services, estimated annual Iranian subsidies to Hamas to be approximately US$ 100 million in 2010. According to this source, the Iranian funds were at the time mostly flowing through the Hamas Political Bureau in Damascus and used primarily for weapons purchases and shipments.90

2010 to 2013

Between 2010 and 2012, the relations between Sunni Hamas and Shia Iran deteriorated and the latter reportedly decreased its funding significantly, or even stopped it altogether. Most experts explain the development with Hamas’ refusal to show public support for the Syrian regime against the uprising.91 Although the exiled Hamas leadership had been hosted by the Assad regime in Damascus for a decade, it refused to back the government against the mainly Sunni rebels, incurring the wrath of Assad’s close allies in Tehran. Consequently Khalid Meshaal, the head of Hamas’ Political Bureau, and other members of the external Hamas leadership left Syria in 2012.92

In May 2013, media reports quoted Hamas leaders stating that Iran cut up to US$ 23 million a month in funding due to the movement’s position on the uprising in Syria.93 Ghazi Hamad, Hamas’s deputy foreign minister, described the relations with Iran as “bad,” adding that “I can say it is not like the past. I cannot give you the exact amount. For supporting the Syrian revolution, we lost very much.[…] I cannot deny that since 2006 Iran supported Hamas with money and many [other] things.[…] I cannot say there is military cooperation.”94

The cut of Iranian support was also confirmed in October 2013 by Moussa Abu Marzouk, the deputy head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, who was quoted saying that “Iran used to be the most supportive state to Hamas in all aspects: money, arms and training. We don’t deny this […]. Our position on Syria affected relations with Iran. Its support for us never stopped, but the amounts [of money] were significantly reduced.”95

The drying up of funding apparently caused a serious financial crisis in the Gaza Strip. This was exacerbated in the second half of 2013 by the closure of the smuggling tunnels between the Gaza Strip and Egypt by the new regime in Cairo.96 Nevertheless, some reports indicate that Hamas’s military capabilities have nevertheless been augmented through Iranian technological assistance and training, either provided directly or indirectly via Hezbollah Lebanon.97

2014 onwards

Taher al-Nounou, an aide to Gaza’s Prime Minister, Ismail Haniyeh, was quoted in early 2014 saying that the ties with Iran were weakened by the war in Syria, but not severed. In reply to the question whether Tehran had resumed its financial support, Nounou said that “[w]e don’t announce these things because there would be efforts to stop it.”98 The relationship reportedly improved further during 2014, with financial support being raised around March, but to levels lower than the ones at the end of 2012.99 At the same time, reports emerged about alleged rockets shipments from Iran to the Gaza Strip.100

In August 2014, the Head of the Political Bureau of Hamas, Khalid Mashaal, praised the important role of Iran’s financial and military assistance.101 In December 2014, Palestine Today news site quoted Senior Hamas Leader Mousa Abu Marzouq stating that “Iran is the only country that has stood beside Hamas and provided the resistance movement with financial, weaponry and training assistance”. He also mentioned Iran’s contributions to the improvement of Hamas’ military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades.102

According to an April 2015 article in the Wall Street Journal, intelligence reports indicated that relations between the IRGC and the Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades had been restored towards the end of 2014 and Iran had revived funding, facilitating tunnel reconstruction and medium-range missiles procurement in early 2015. According to a senior Western intelligence official, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards transferred tens of millions of dollars to the Qassam Brigades in the first months of 2015. Funds were allegedly transferred on the direct orders of General Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the IRGC Qods Force, who also dedicated an annual budget to finance Hamas’s military operations.103

In August 2015, the Iranian Foreign Ministry underlined its support for the Palestinian Hamas, as well as other ‘resistance groups’ in the region, without specifying the type of support provided. This came in response to media reports claiming that a member of Hamas had criticized Iran for weakened support. A senior Hamas official was quoted saying that “Iran’s various supports [sic] for Palestine have been precious, abundant and greatly influenced the Palestinian resistance”.104 Iran publicly confirmed to be arming Hamas, among others, and providing the militia with ‘Fajr-5’ missiles.105

2.5 The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (since 2007)

While Hamas pursues a goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in place of Israel, the Islamic Jihad is almost exclusively focused on terrorist acts to achieve its goals. And where Hamas in recent years faced cuts in Iranian financing due to a lack of support for al-Assad in Syria, the Islamic Jihad saw a cut-back in its funding due to a lack of support for the Houthi rebels in Yemen.106

In the past, the Islamic Jihad was seen as having the closest ties with Iran out of all the Palestinian factions, as well as close relations with Iran’s allies Syria and Hezbollah.107 Quoted in Arabic-language Raya News, Ali Nourizadeh, Director of the Center for Iranian Studies, estimated that the Islamic Jihad received between US$ 100 and US$ 150 million annually until 2014. The group allegedly received its Iranian money via Hezbollah or through banks in Beirut or Malta. According to Nourizadeh, Islamic Jihad fighters were trained in Iran and the group’s weapons all came from Iran, with Hezbollah playing an important role in the supply line.108

Since Tehran pulled its funding for the group earlier in 2015, the Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip has reportedly been suffering a severe financial crisis. A television station belonging to the group was shut down, and so did some of its few non-military institutions. Salary payments also had to be stopped temporarily, both to its military wing (the al-Qods Brigades) and civil staff.109

2.6 Houthi rebels in Yemen (since 2010)

Iran’s involvement in Yemen goes back years. One of the key reasons for Iran to arm and finance the Shia Muslim rebels is the common adversary of Saudi Arabia, even though the Houthis had previously been supported by Saudi Arabia.110 According to media reports, Yemeni analysts and US officials, the Iranian support ranges from political and religious support for Houthi leaders to military training, provision of weapons and active involvement in the fighting, as well as humanitarian support.111 According to US analysts, the support to Yemen’s Houthi rebels is managed by Lebanese national Khalil Harb, a former special operations commander and a close advisor to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.112

The level of Iranian support received by the Houthis is uncertain. Various analysts voiced opinions that it appears to be not nearly as systematic or significant as that provided to closer allies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon (see section 2.2).113 Domestic tensions are seen as the key underlying reasons for the conflict rather than the Houthis acting as Iran’s proxies, as is the case in other conflicts in the region.114

Iranian support seems to be mostly provided in the form of training and military support.115 Several US official and intelligence sources, as well as UN experts, assert that Iran has transferred weapons to the Houthi rebels and provided military trainings.116 In March 2012, US officials stated that there appeared to be “[…] a relatively small but steady stream of automatic rifles, grenade launchers, bomb-making material and several million dollars in cash” sent by Iran to the Houthi rebels.117 US intelligence sources estimated in 2011 that Iranian operatives had provided “millions of dollars” to Houthi leaders.118 While no concrete figures are given, Houthi leaders admitted already in 2012 that they had received Iranian funds.119 In 2013, the US Department of State’s terrorism reports stated that, “Iran actively supports members of the Houthi movement, including activities intended to build military capabilities.”120

In October 2014, Ali Akbar Velayati, a spokesman for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was quoted saying in a meeting with a group of Yemeni clerics in Tehran that “the Islamic Republic of Iran supports the rightful struggles of Ansarullah [the party of the Houthis] in Yemen, and considers the movement part of the successful Islamic Awakening”.121

In December 2014, Reuters quoted unnamed Yemeni, Iranian and Western sources confirming Iranian military and financial support to the Houthi rebels before and after their takeover of Sanaa in September 2014. According to Yemeni security officials, “[b]efore the entrance into Sanaa, Iran started sending weapons here and gave a lot of support with money via visits abroad.” These transfers apparently also continued in the following months. An unnamed senior Iranian official confirmed to Reuters that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s Qods Force had several hundred military personnel in Yemen who train Houthi fighters. The official also stated that the pace of money and arms provided to the Houthis had increased since their seizure of Sanaa in September 2014.122 An unnamed Western source familiar with Yemen was quoted by Reuters in December 2014 stating that “[w]e think there is cash, some of which is channelled via Hezbollah and sacks of cash arriving at the airport”.123

A Houthi official visiting Washington in early 2015, Ali Al-Emad, denied major financial backing or arms were coming from Iran. However, around the same time, a Houthi official in Yemen confirmed that assistance was provided by Iran in the form of logistics, intelligence and cash. He was quoted saying that “Houthis have received tens of millions of dollars in cash from Iran over the past couple of years”.124

Sources in the Lebanese government confirmed that Iran sent fighter pilots to Lebanon, where they received Lebanese passports and travelled on to Yemen to join the Houthi rebels.125 David Weinberg, a Yemen analyst at the US Foundation for Defense of Democracies, asserts that “Tehran does not exercise command and control over Ansar Allah (the Houthi militia). […] But credible reports confirm that it has been providing on-the-ground advising …training overseas, major sums of money and weapons by the literal ton.”126

In the first months of 2015, Iran reportedly put pressure on Hezbollah to send advisors to Yemen in support of the Houthi fighters, to help them secure cities they had captured. Hezbollah had already been training Houthi officials in the previous year in the use of media tools.127 In an analysis for the EU Policy Department on External Policies, Ahmed Saif from the Sheba Centre for Strategic Studies in Yemen talks about Iran providing “[…] remarkable direct financial and technical support to the movement through the Lebanese Hizbullah”.128

In April 2015, a spokeswoman for the US Department of State was quoted saying that “[t]here is a well-documented history of (Iranian) support for the Houthi, including in various State Department reports — money, weapons — support for a very long time”.129 These statements are confirmed by a confidential UN report presented to the Security Council in April 2015, finding that Iran had supplied the Houthi rebels with weapons since at least 2009, the beginning of the Shia militia’s uprising. The UN experts found “[…] a pattern of arms shipments to Yemen by sea that can be traced back to at least 2009″ and reported that “[t]he analysis further suggests that the Islamic Republic of Iran was the origin of these shipments and that the intended recipients were the Houthis in Yemen or possibly in some cases further recipients in neighboring countries”.130 According to US government sources, Iran supported the Houthis among others with unknown quantities of ‘AK-47s’, rocket-propelled grenades and other arms.131

2.7 The Al-Assad regime in Syria (since 2011)

The foreign support received by the Syrian regime, especially from Iran, but also from Russia and China, is seen as crucial in allowing Bashar al-Assad to stay in place for so long.132 Different levels of Iranian involvement in the ongoing war in Syria have been reported from early on in the conflict.133 As put by Karim Sadjadpour, a senior associate of the Middle East programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “[a]bsent Iranian largesse, Assad would not be financially solvent today”.134 According to the UN’s envoy to Syria and other outside experts, Iran is spending billions of dollars a year to prop up the Syrian regime since the start of the revolution in March 2011.

Five groups play a crucial role in maintaining Assad’s rule in Syria, all of which are directly or indirectly financially supported by Iran:

• the Syrian armed forces, namely, the Syrian Air Force, the Military Intelligence (Mukhabarat), and the Syrian Army;
• Syrian paramilitary forces, which operate under the banner of the National Defence Forces;
• Hezbollah Lebanon;
• Other foreign Shia militias, mostly from Iraq and Afghanistan; and
• The Qods Force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps.135

Despite Iran’s banks and businesses being cut off from the international financial systems, many experts in the field estimate Iranian support to Syria to be substantial, especially when factoring in credit lines, oil subsidies, conventional and unconventional military aid, intelligence and training provided to the above-named groups.136

Fuel supplies

In 2012, Iran and Syria had arranged a gasoline-for-diesel swap, but the loss of Syria’s main oil producing areas to IS and other armed groups meant that the Assad regime no longer commanded over the light crude it produced, nor the extra gasoline and naphtha it used to export. Iran also sealed a free trade deal with Syria granting the Syrian exports a low four percent customs tariff.137

According to statements by the US State Department, Iran has begun to direct shipments of crude oil to Syria in the first months of 2014. These had been done from time to time before but their frequency reportedly increased at that point.138

The shipments are said to be vital to the Assad regime as the war ravaged Syria’s crude production, which fell from about 400,000 barrels a day to roughly 20,000 barrels. Analysis conducted by Bloomberg suggests that Iran sent about 10 million barrels of crude oil to Syria between January and June 2015, equaling approximately to US$ 600 million in aid in those six months, or around US$ 1.2 billion annually. At the same time, it is highly unlikely that the Assad regime is paying for the deliveries, considering the state of its economy and diminishing currency reserves.139

Credit facilities

In January 2013, Syrian state media announced a US$ 1 billion credit facility agreement with Iran. Along with the agreement between the Commercial Bank of Syria and the Export Development Bank of Iran, seven contracts on energy transmission and electrical equipment were signed, with around half of the credit amount dedicated to the electricity sector.140

According to banking sources, Tehran also agreed in early 2013, during a visit by Syrian Prime Minister Wael al-Halki, to deposit US$ 500 million in Syria’s central bank vaults to prop up the local currency.141

In June 2013, another credit line provided by Iran with a value of US$ 3.6 billion was announced, with proceeds destined to finance the purchase of petrol and associated products, including diesel for the country’s army. The credit, which was channelled through the state-owned Commercial Bank of Syria and Iran’s Bank Saderat, allows Iran to acquire equity stakes in investments in Syria.142

Preliminary approval for another US$ 1 billion credit line was reportedly given by Iran in May 2015.143 In July 2015, al-Assad signed a law to ratify the agreement, according to Syria’s state news agency.144

Overall estimates of support

As with other armed conflicts in the region, Iranian activities in Syria are overseen by the IRGC Qods Force. The United States first exposed Iran’s assistance to the Syrian government in the ongoing conflict in April 2011, when President Barack Obama announced new sanctions against the Qods Force pursuant to Executive Order 13572, which blocks property of certain persons with Respect to Human Rights Abuses in Syria.145 In addition to the Qods Force, Western analysts say the IRGC Ground Force, members of Iranian intelligence services and law enforcement forces have also been providing material support to the Syrian regime.146

Based on US sources and Iranian official statements, the Qods Force and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah (see section 2.2) have provided training, high-level advisers, weapons and equipment to a 50,000 strong Syrian alliance of local Shia and Alawite militias known as al-Jaysh al-Shabi (the Popular Army, which was later rebranded as the National Defence Forces) to aid Syrian regime forces since mid-2012.147 Hezbollah leader Nasrallah stated to be fighting alongside Assad’s troops to prevent Syria falling “into the hands” of Sunni jihadi radicals, the US and Israel.148

Iranian recruiters reportedly offer Syrian militiamen training and monthly salaries ranging between US$ 200 and US$ 500.149 According to the US government, Iran has also “[…] provided routine funding worth millions of dollars to the militia.”150,a

In addition to Syrian and other foreign Shia militiamen fighting on the side of al-Assad, there have also been hundreds of Iranian fighters and commanders from the Qods and Basij forces participating in and directing battles in Syria, particularly since mid-2013.151 Lebanese sources quoted by Reuters in early October 2015 reported that hundreds of Iranian ground troops had entered Syria recently. Backed by Russian air strikes, they were expected to join Syrian regime and Hezbollah forces in a major ground offensive in the northern parts of the country.152

Overall estimates on Iran’s support to the Assad regime and militias fighting on its side vary widely. In June 2015, the special UN envoy to Syria, Staffan de Mistura, was quoted saying that Iran is spending approximately US$ 6 billion a year to sustain the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad.153 Somewhat higher estimates of US$ 7 billion to US$ 8.5 billion per year were made by an Arab security source in 2013.154

Nadim Shehadi, the director of the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies at Tufts University, gave even higher estimates, as his research showed that Iran spent between US$ 14 and US$ 15 billion in military and economic aid to the Syrian regime in 2012 and 2013.155 Hokayem (2014) quotes Western intelligence estimating Tehran spent US$ 15 billion to US$ 19 billion to directly support to al-Assad between 2011 and 2014.156 Similar estimates were made by experts from the Iranian oppositional Green Movement.157 Even though the Obama administration never disclosed its own estimates on how much Iran is spending on backing the Syrian regime, these estimates are considerably higher than what has been implied by the US government about Iran’s spending on its destabilisation policy in the Middle East.158

Steven Heydemann, until recently vice president for applied research on conflict at the US Institute of Peace, estimates that the value of Iranian oil transfers, credit lines, military personnel costs and subsidies for weapons for the Syrian government was likely between US$ 3.5 and US$ 4 billion annually. Factoring in indirect support through Hezbollah and other militias fighting Assad’s opponents in Syria, he estimates the total support from Iran to al-Assad would total between US$ 15 billion to US$ 20 billion annually.159

A Beirut-based diplomat and Western security sources estimated in early 2015 that Iran funnels between US$ 1 billion to US$ 2 billion a month into Syria, equivalent to approximately US$ 12 billion to US$ 24 billion annually. Of that, some US$ 6 billion is supposedly spent on military assistance, mostly for the Syrian National Defence Forces.160

In reaction to the expected nuclear deal between the United States and Iran, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad stated in July 2015 that he expected more support from Iran, his main ally in the region. He was quoted saying in a telegram to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that “[w]e are confident that the Islamic Republic of Iran will support, with greater drive, just causes of nations and work for peace and stability in the region and the world”.161

2.8 Sources of financial support

Iranian decision makers have made large funds available to various groups involved in Middle East conflicts over the years in order to increase their regional influence. Doing so despite being heavily constrained by international sanctions shows the level of importance that the Iranian regime places on this goal.162 While there are clear indications that various types of support are channeled to paramilitary forces in various countries, the financial trails of Iran funding any of these groups remain largely non-transparent. There has been ample speculation over the years on how the IRGC Qod Force in particular is financed and what assets are at the direct disposal of the Supreme Leader Khamenei, but the available data is still largely based on assumptions.

When talking about ‘Iran’ as a source of funds, it is important to keep in mind that it is unlikely that the financial assistance originating from the country passes in its entirety through official governmental channels and appears in publicly available budgets. Rather, it has to be concluded that Iranian support for militant groups is partly disguised in government budgets, but for a large part comes from funds managed outside of the official government structures.163

The following sections briefly describe some suspected sources of funding. Due to the mentioned knowledge gaps around actual budgets and money flows, it is not possible to confidently link them to specific conflicts or militias.

2.8.1 Military and defence spending

In the mid-1980s, the Iranian government budget included an item for “promoting revolutions abroad”, in all likelihood referring to the financing of Hezbollah’s activities in various countries as well as other foreign paramilitary groups linked to Tehran. Until 1998, the Iranian Foreign Ministry had an office, headed by a Director-General, for “exporting the Islamic Revolution”.164

While defence and military spending does show up in the official budgets signed off by the Iranian Parliament, there is a lack of precise information on how much funding is allocated to each branch of Iran’s military or to special operations forces. Additionally, defence spending may not reflect all of Iran’s expenditure in defence-related activities.165 US experts claim that Iran’s defence budget excludes much of its spending on intelligence activities and support of foreign non-state actors through the IRGC and its special forces.166 Similarly, the defence expenditure overviews of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) also state that the paramilitary forces are not included in its figures.167

The official defence and military spending in Iran has been relatively low over the years when compared with the rest of the region.168 As a percentage of GDP, it has stayed relatively stable, between 2.4 percent to 3.6 percent between 2000 and 2010. In the financial years 2011 and 2012, the share decreased to 2.5 percent and 2.3 percent respectively.169 As previously mentioned, these figures from the SIPRI do not include the budgets allocated for paramilitary forces though.

In recent years, official military and defence spending by Iran has significantly increased again, despite the economic difficulties that the country has been facing. For 2015/16, the Iranian government reported that it intends to spend IRR 282 trillion (US$ 10.4 billion) or 3.4 percent of its total budget on defense. Compared to the previous fiscal year, the official 2015/16 defence budget increased by about 33 percent from the IRR 212 trillion (US$ 7.9 billion) in 2014/15.170,b

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

With IRR 174 trillion (US$ 6.2 billion) of the defence budget officially assigned to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), this represents 62 percent of the defence budget, or 2.2 percent of the country’s total budget in 2015/16. The official budget assigned to the IRGC increased by more than 50 percent from the 2014/15 budget of IRR 115 trillion.171

The IRGC is the second military force in the country besides the regular army. It was created by Ayatollah Khomeini in May 1979 and is responsible for protecting the ‘Islamic Revolution’ and its achievements. The IRGC is seen as the key link to militias supported by Iran in various Middle East conflicts, providing training, funding and arms.172

The elite Qods Force (IRGC-QF) was established within the IRGC in 1990. Its current leader, General Qassem Soleimani, reports directly to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.173 The Qods Force maintains operational capabilities around the world – in the Middle East, in North Africa and, more recently, in Latin America – using military, political and economic power to advance Iran’s national interests. The groups that the force backs do not always share Iranian revolutionary principles, but are sometimes also chosen on the basis of common interests or enemies. This is the case, for example, with the support provided to Palestinian Hamas (see section 2.4).174

Having acquired large economic power under the presidency of Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), the IRGC is still seen to hold a very strong position in the country also under the more moderate Rouhani due to its ability to tap into state funds as well as presiding over vast independent resources.175 As Al-Jazeera reported in February 2014, when US Foreign Minister Kerry tried to talk to his Iranian colleague Mohammad Javad Zarif about Syria during the Munich Security Conference, Zarif said that “he does not control the Syria portfolio”, which is explained with the IRGC being the decision-makers on Iran’s military support for Hezbollah and the Syrian regime.176

In addition to the contributions from the military budget, the Revolutionary Guards preside over a vast business empire that generates a substantial income. Businesses acquired during a privatisation wave since the early 2000s include mobile phone networks, oil companies, and car manufacturing and construction companies. Many of the firms the force owns allegedly do not have to pay taxes or open their books to government inspectors.177 In an unusual move, Rouhani suggested in early 2015 that he would support a resolution passed by the Iranian parliament to tax organisations overseen by the Supreme Leader Khamenei and the armed forces (see section 2.8) which so far are exempt from taxation, some of them probably even benefiting from the sanctions.178

There have been accusations for years that the IRGC also controls smuggling networks.179 Circumventing international sanctions, experts are convinced that the IRGC was able to thrive due to its control over smuggling of illegal commodities into the country and exports of state-subsidised oil.180 Such allegations have also been voiced by members of the Iranian Parliament (‘Majles’) in 2007.181

Over the years, the funds available to the IRGC have been investigated by several analysts and experts. In 2004, a study of the Tehran University estimated the annual turnover of IRGC businesses at US$ 12 billion, resulting in a net profit of US$ 1.9 billion.182 Quoting local businessmen and economists and foreign political analysts, a 2007 media report estimated that the IRGC had ties to over 100 companies, controlling over US$ 12 billion in revenues.183 A similar figure was quoted by an unnamed Western diplomat recently, estimating the IRGC’s annual turnover at US$ 10 billion to US$ 12 billion.184 These enormous funds have allowed the IRGC for many years to exert influence in Iran and finance military operations abroad, largely independently from the constraints of the official budget.185

However, it seems that the tightening of sanctions in 2012, imposing additional restrictions on the banking and oil sectors, also impacted IRGC-affiliated companies and individuals. Many of them have been blacklisted by the US and the EU. As a consequence, even the IRGC was reportedly faced with economic problems in a number of business areas.186

Ministry of Intelligence and Security

The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is also suspected of being involved in the funding of Iranian operations related to various conflicts in the Middle East and beyond. US government analysts see it as being closely related to the IRGC.187 In 2012, the US Treasury Department designated the MOIS for human rights abuses and support of terrorism, such as providing Hezbollah and Hamas with financial, material or technological support.188 Already in 2003, the district court of Columbia in the US stated during a case around Hamas suicide bombings in Jerusalem that “Iran funnels much of its support to Hamas through MOIS, a ministry with approximately 30,000 employees and a budget of between $100,000,000 and $400,000,000. […] With Iranian government funds, MOIS spends between $50,000,000 and $100,000,000 a year sponsoring terrorist activities of various organizations such as Hamas.”189

In the current fiscal year 2015/16, the publicly announced, yet unlikely to be fully reported, budget available to the Ministry is US$ 790 million.190

2.8.2 Bonyads

Another sub-system of Iran’s religious civil society which is suspected to not only fulfil a charitable role but also to provide funding for foreign militias, namely Hezbollah, is the network of charitable religious foundations known as ‘bonyads’.

Following the money trail and identifying which bonyads are involved proves to be difficult though, as researched by Saad-Ghorayep in 2012.191 Bonyads are described as ‘parastatal revolutionary foundations’ with large assets controlled by key religious leaders at their disposal, allegedly for charitable purposes. Apparently some of the largest bonyads are controlled by IRGC members.192

Besides funds accumulated from decades from individual donations, these foundations also control large business and industry conglomerates that together control a large portion of the Iranian economy. The biggest bonyad of all is the ‘Bonyad-e Mostazafen va Janbazan’ (Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled), which reportedly is the second largest company in Iran after the state-owned National Iranian Oil Company. Another major bonyad that is also alleged to finance Hezbollah’s activities, is the ‘Shrine of Imam Reza Foundation’, reportedly the largest landowner in Iran.193

They have been characterised as a parallel economy that competes with and undercuts the private sector. They fall outside of formal state control as they are so far not obliged to publish financial accounts or to pay taxes. At the same time, they possess a significant degree of political power. Close ties with influential government members and religious leaders mean that they are not exactly operating outside of the Iranian state.194

2.8.3 Maraji taqlid

Iranian ‘maraji taqlid’ (religious sources of emulation) are allegedly also a source of financial support to Hezbollah. Iranian Shiites pay a religious tax known as ‘khums’ to the maraji, with annual revenues estimated to reach several millions of dollars. These are meant to be distributed to people in need; however, the choice of recipients lies to a large degree with the maraji.195 Hezbollah’s representative in Iran, Abdallah Safieddine, was quoted in Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar in 2012 explaining that “Hezbollah is entitled to a share of these “religious legal rights,” […] on account of the fact that “it defends Muslims everywhere.”196

2.8.4 Setad Ejraiye Farmane Hazrate Emam

Hezbollah leader Nasrallah revealed in a speech in Beirut in 2006 that the US$ 300 million the party had paid in compensation to families who had lost their homes during the 2006 war, was “all religious legal money (amwal shariyeh) from Sayyid Ali Khamenei.” Abdallah Safieddine, Hezbollah’s representative in Iran, stated in an interview in 2012 that his party receives funding directly from the Wali al-Faqih, or the Supreme Leader of Iran himself, as “Khamenei has his own budget outside the state,” which is financed by certain “religious associations other than the awqaf /bonyads […].”197

The Saudi newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat reported in September 2014 that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei continued to fund Hezbollah through his discrete budget, even after the government’s flow of money had been stopped by the president a few months earlier.198 Such a direct financial relationship with Khamenei would also explain why a group like Hezbollah remained largely unaffected by changes of government in Iran over the years.199

Iran’s Supreme Leader controls an extensive yet clandestine business conglomerate called ‘Setad Ejraiye Farmane Hazrate Emam’ (Setad), or ‘The Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order’ (EIKO)).200,c Little details are known about the activities of related entities. Reuters investigated and published more detailed information about Setad for the first time in 2013. Figure 1 shows a simplified structure of Setad’s estimated holdings.

Figure 1: Setad’s estimated holdings

Source: Internal Setad documents, Tehran Stock Exchange, company websites, US Treasury Department, in Stecklow, S., Dehghanpisheh, B. and Y. Torbati (2013, November 11), “Khamenei controls massive financial empire built on property seizures”, Reuters.

The investigation revealed that Setad oversees a major network of 37 supposedly private businesses through two main subsidiaries: one managing and controlling Setad’s international front companies, and another managing billions of dollars in investments.201,d

The secrecy of the organisation’s accounts makes it impossible to accurately identify the value of its holdings. Based on an analysis of statements by Setad officials, Tehran Stock Exchange data, company websites, and information from the US Treasury Department, the Reuters calculations come to the conclusion that Setad’s holdings of real estate, corporate stakes and other assets have a value of about US$ 95 billion, an amount approximately 40 percent bigger than the country’s total oil exports in 2012.202

The US Treasury Department estimates that Setad has made tens of billions of dollars in annual profit through favourable loan rates from Iranian banks and the sale and management of real estate holdings. This includes property donated to Setad, as well as property confiscated from Iranian dissidents. The Treasury Department concluded that “[i]n addition to generating revenue for the Iranian leadership, EIKO has been tasked with assisting the Iranian Government’s circumvention of U.S. and international sanctions. Because of this unique mission, EIKO has received all of the funding it needs to facilitate transactions through its access to the Iranian leadership”.203

It is unknown how much of Setad’s revenues is being allocated to the groups and conflicts that are the focus of this paper. However, as the Reuters investigators concluded, Setad certainly puts Khamenei in a position to operate independently from parliament and the national budget.204 While the funds accumulated via religious donations and investments in property and commerce are likely also affected by Iran’s difficult economic situation, analysts see the solid money reserve as sufficient to keep up financial backing for militant groups like Hezbollah.205

 

Notes & References

a. Details on how these salaries are paid can be found in Naam Sham’s 2014 report Iran in Syria – From an Ally of the Regime to an Occupying Force, available at http://www.naameshaam.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/report_iran_in_syria_201411.pdf.

b. Including official budget lines for the regular army, IRGC and Basij Guards.

c. The name refers to an edict signed by the Islamic Republic’s first leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, shortly before his death in 1989, creating a new entity to manage and sell properties ‘abandoned’ by its owners after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Many of these properties belonged to supporters of the pre-1979 Shah regime or to leftist and progressive Iranians opposing the Shah and Khomeini’s theocracy.

d. A graphical illustration of the international financial network of the ‘The Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO)’ is available on the website of the US Department of the Treasury (see US Department of the Treasury (2013, June), The Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO) International Financial Network, online: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/eiko_chart.pdf, accessed in September 2015)

3. Katzman, K. (2015, June 30), Iran’s Foreign Policy, Washington DC, United States: Congressional Research Service, p.4.

4. De Luce, D. (2015, July 9), “Syrian war takes rising toll on Hezbollah”, Foreign Policy, online: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/09/syrian-war-takes-rising-toll-on-hezbollah/, accessed in September 2015;
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5. BBC News (2013, December 4), “Profile: Lebanon’s Hezbollah movement”, online: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-10814698, accessed in September 2015.

6. Masters, J. and Z. Laub (2014, January), “Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu’llah)”, Council on Foreign Affairs, online: http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-k-hizbollah-hizbullah/p9155, accessed in September 2015.

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38. Nayef Krayem (at the time al-Manar’s general manager and chairman of the board), cited in: Jorisch, A. (2004), Beacon of Hatred – Inside Hizballah’s Al-Manar Television, Washington, United States: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, p.32;
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